

Europe Gas Tracker Report





ABOUT GLOBAL ENERGY MONITOR

Global Energy Monitor (GEM) develops and analyzes data on energy infrastructure, resources, and uses. We provide open access to information that is essential to building a sustainable energy future. Follow us at www.globalenergymonitor.org and on Twitter/X @GlobalEnergyMon.

ABOUT THE EUROPE GAS TRACKER

The <u>Europe Gas Tracker</u> is an online database that identifies, maps, describes, and categorizes gas infrastructure in the European Union and surrounding nations, including gas pipelines, liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals, gas-fired power plants, and gas fields. Developed by Global Energy Monitor, the tracker uses footnoted wiki pages to document each project and is updated annually.

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ON THE COVER

The cover photo shows the LNG Tanker Arctic Voyager in the Baltic Sea by Klaipeda, Lithuania. <u>Image</u> from Shutterstock with credit to Vytautas Kielaitis.

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FURTHER RESOURCES

To obtain data from the Europe Gas Tracker project, visit the <u>Download Data</u> page and the <u>Summary Tables</u>. All Global Energy Monitor data are freely available under a <u>Creative</u> <u>Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License</u> unless otherwise noted.



Europe Gas Tracker Report 2024

KEY POINTS

- With €84.1 billion in new liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals and gas pipelines in planning, a gas infrastructure buildout is proceeding in Europe as if the region were still in crisis, even though it is in a far more secure position than it was two years ago. Compared to one year ago, there is 9% more LNG import capacity in development and 18% more pipeline projects by length in development. If built, these projects would increase Europe's total gas import capacity by 55%.
- New gas infrastructure in Europe is unnecessary. Europe already has two times as much LNG import capacity as LNG demand, and this gap could grow to a factor of four by 2030 if planned projects are built. Increasing Europe's gas import capacity also fails to address energy security risks inherent to the fuel: It is subject to price volatility and supply disruptions.
- LNG terminals and gas pipelines already under construction could, if used at full capacity, result in additional greenhouse gas emissions totaling 195 megatonnes CO₂ equivalent (CO₂e) per year, equivalent to that of 50 coal plants and at odds with the European Union's (EU) plan to reduce emissions by 55% by 2030. Including proposed projects, this figure grows six-fold. Meanwhile, renewables generation in Europe is on the rise, with generation from wind power surpassing that of gas for the first time in 2023. Doubling down on gas would be out of step with Europe's energy transition.
- An emerging hydrogen buildout with 35,000 kilometers (km) of hydrogen transmission pipelines planned threatens to justify building new gas infrastructure while offering false climate solutions, and recent EU policies offer major support to these plans.
- Although Europe's LNG plans have advanced quickly, several high-profile project setbacks in 2023 could indicate waning enthusiasm for LNG. Import projects in Ireland, Latvia, and Poland totaling 16.8 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) face uncertain futures due to environmental objections or low interest among their backers. Overall, GEM finds that 17.6 bcm/y of LNG import capacity in development is shelved and at least 60.6 bcm/y delayed.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As Europe emerges from the second winter since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the region appears to be in a far more secure position than it was at the start of its gas crisis. Nonetheless, data from Global Energy Monitor (GEM) show the push to build new LNG import terminals and gas pipelines, currently estimated to cost €84.1 billion, continues as if the region were on crisis footing.

According to GEM's Europe Gas Tracker, European countries are developing 248.7 bcm/y in new LNG import capacity and 16,491 km in new gas transmission pipelines, which includes cross-border pipelines capable of importing a further 46 bcm/y of gas into Europe. In the year since <u>GEM's 2023 report</u> on the Europe Gas Tracker, eight LNG terminals were brought online, boosting the region's import capacity by onefifth, and the slate of new projects in development has grown by 9% for LNG import capacity and 18% for gas pipelines length. If built, this gas infrastructure could increase Europe's import capacity by as much as 55%.

Proposals to build new LNG terminals risk exacerbating the underutilization of existing gas infrastructure and saddling Europe's economies with expensive stranded assets, as the region plans to <u>sharply reduce</u> greenhouse gas emissions in the coming years. A wave of new gas projects would be inconsistent with the energy transition envisioned in European policy.

Meanwhile, industry and government support is coalescing behind a parallel 35,000 km buildout of new hydrogen and "hydrogen-ready" gas pipelines. This proposed hydrogen expansion would provide the gas industry an opportunity to further entrench methane gas in Europe's energy transition, since many projects would begin operating with gas or blended hydrogen. Because of the technical and economic challenges in transitioning gas infrastructure to hydrogen, a hydrogen network as currently envisioned by industry could offer implausible or even counterproductive climate solutions.

This report analyzes data from GEM's Europe Gas Tracker, updated through the end of January 2024, focusing on LNG terminals and gas transmission pipelines. The full Europe Gas Tracker data set is <u>available</u> <u>for download</u> on GEM's website and additionally includes data on oil- and gas-fired power plants and extraction sites.¹

^{1.} For more information on the scope of the Europe Gas Tracker, see the tracker's <u>methodology page</u>. For global data on gas pipelines and LNG terminals, see GEM's <u>Global Gas Infrastructure Tracker</u>.

THE STATE OF EUROPE'S GAS BUILDOUT

Europe has emerged from its gas crisis

After Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU vowed to curtail Russian gas imports at the risk of facing gas shortages. The EU consumes gas predominantly for power and heat generation, industry, and household use, with about one-third of households relying on gas for heating. In 2021, the bloc was dependent on Russia for about 45% of its gas imports. The European Commission's **REPowerEU plan**, launched in May 2022, set out a roadmap for the EU to reduce its dependence on Russian gas by curbing gas demand, boosting renewable energy deployment, and filling the immediate shortfall in gas with U.S. LNG imports, among other actions. As Europe drew LNG cargoes away from Asia, LNG prices spiked, turning Europe's crisis into a <u>global</u> gas crisis. Wealthier importers like Japan paid exorbitant prices for LNG, and emerging economies such as **Bangladesh** and Pakistan were locked out of the market entirely.

Now, as Europe emerges from its second winter since the invasion, a case can be made that <u>Europe's gas</u> <u>crisis is over</u>. Gas storage levels have been higher than average the past two winters, with storage sites 99.6% full this November, and Europe is capable of importing enough gas from global markets (even if at <u>great</u> <u>expense</u>) to meet demand. As of January 2024, <u>prices</u> <u>for gas deliveries</u> were around €36 per megawatt-hour (MWh), which is above the average between 2015 and 2019 but not exceptionally high.

Meanwhile, the EU has made significant progress toward achieving its goals in the REPowerEU plan.

According to Columbia University's <u>REPowerEU</u> <u>Tracker</u>, the region is on track to eliminate Russian gas imports by 2027, nearly on track to deploy 592 gigawatts (GW) of solar photovoltaic capacity by 2030, and on track to reduce its 2030 energy consumption 13% lower than an EU forecast made in 2020.

Perhaps most importantly, Europe's demand for gas is down and forecasted to decline this decade. The EU's total <u>gas consumption fell by over 7%</u> in 2023 compared to 2022. High gas prices have <u>depressed</u> <u>industrial gas demand</u> — which, as of June 2023, was at its lowest level in four years — and <u>industrial demand</u> <u>may never fully recover</u> to pre-crisis levels. Ember's European Electricity Review 2024 found that gas generation has fallen for four years in a row, and for the first time, total generation from <u>gas was surpassed</u> <u>by that of wind</u> power. Ember also found that wind and solar remained cheaper than gas in 2023 and that renewable costs will only continue to fall.

According to the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) European LNG Tracker, gas demand is forecasted to <u>continue to decline by 11%</u> between 2023 and 2030. Importantly, if the EU is to meet the goal in its <u>Fit for 55</u> plan to reduce emissions by 55% by 2030, gas consumption <u>must fall by at least</u> <u>33%</u>, according to analysis by E3G.

As the threat of gas shortages passes and overall gas demand is on the decline, new gas import projects are out of step with Europe's energy transition.

Yet Europe's gas buildout could be far from over

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Europe has brought online nine new LNG terminals and four new gas transmission pipelines, in addition to several expansion projects at existing facilities (Table 1). The eight LNG import terminals added in 2023 alone add a combined 46.5 bcm/y in import capacity, an increase of 17% to the region's existing capacity. The majority of these LNG terminals are floating storage and regasification units (FSRU), which have been favored because they can be deployed faster and more flexibly than land-based terminals.

Table 1. LNG import terminal and gas pipeline projects commissioned in Europe between January 2022 and January 2024

| Project name | Country | Capacity (bcm/y) | Estimated cost (million €) | Month commissioned |
|---|---------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|
| | Pipeline projects | | | |
| Beglej-Dermantsi-Batultsi-Kalugerovo Pipeline Rehabilitation and Partial Replacement | Bulgaria | | 67.48 | January 2022 |
| Medgaz Gas Pipeline Capacity Expansion | Spain | 2.7 | 67 | February 2022 |
| Gas Interconnection Poland-Lithuania (508 km) | Poland, Lithuania | 2.4 | 566 | May 2022 |
| Poland-Slovakia Gas Pipeline (165 km) | Poland, Slovakia | 5.7 | 270 | August 2022 |
| Baltic Pipe Project | Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Poland | 10.0 | 2,100 | September 2022 |
| Gas Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB) | Greece, Bulgaria | 3.0 | 240 | October 2022 |
| Wilhelmshaven LNG Terminal Pipeline | Germany | 10.0 | 26 | December 2022 |
| Bulgaria-Serbia Interconnector Gas Pipeline | Bulgaria, Serbia | 1.8 | 170 | December 2023 |
| Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline Capacity Expansion | Georgia, Türkiye, Greece | 8.0 | - | 2023 |
| LNG terminal projects | | | | |
| Świnoujście Polskie LNG Terminal Expansion | Poland | 1.2 | 427 | January 2022 |
| Adriatic LNG Terminal Expansion | Italy | 1.0 | - | March 2022 |
| Gate LNG Terminal Expansion | Netherlands | 4.0 | - | May 2022 |
| Krk FSRU Expansion | Croatia | 0.3 | - | April 2022 |
| Eemshaven FSRU | Netherlands | 8.0 | 500 | October 2022 |
| Hamina LNG Terminal | Finland | 0.1 | 100 | October 2022 |
| Revithoussa LNG Terminal FSU Capacity Expansion | Greece | 0.8 | 91 | November 2022 |
| Wilhelmshaven FSRU | Germany | 7.8 | 450 | January 2023 |
| Fos Cavaou LNG Terminal Expansion | France | 1.75 | - | 2022 |
| Inkoo FSRU | Finland | 5.0 | 460 | January 2023 |
| Lubmin FSRU Phase 1 | Germany | 7.8 | 33.3 | January 2023 |
| Brunsbüttel FSRU | Germany | 5.0 | 1,000 | February 2023 |
| Gulf of Saros FSRU | Türkiye | 7.6 | 861 | April 2023 |
| Piombino FSRU | Italy | 5.0 | 566 | July 2023 |
| El Musel LNG Terminal | Spain | 8.0 | 2,440 | August 2023 |
| Le Havre FSRU | France | 5.0 | 566 | October 2023 |
| Dunkirk LNG Terminal Expansion | France | 2.0 | _ | 2023 |

Source: Europe Gas Tracker, Global Energy Monitor

Note: Costs are not estimated for projects in which no new infrastructure was added (e.g., debottlenecking projects) and reported costs are not available. Average values to construct gas pipelines and LNG terminals were used for Europe based on regional calculations with GEM's cost data; for more information, see the Global Gas Infrastructure Tracker (GGIT) cost estimate methodology and Table A6. A large buildout of new gas infrastructure is still in development. European countries are developing 248.7 bcm/y in new LNG import capacity and 16,491 km of new gas transmission pipelines, which includes cross-border pipelines capable of importing a further 46 bcm/y of gas into Europe (Figure 1). GEM estimates the total cost of these projects to be €84.1 billion. About one-fifth of LNG import capacity in development is already in construction (46.7 bcm/y), and likewise for one-tenth of gas pipelines (1,878 km) (Table A1).

Figure 1: European buildout would serve regional import goals

Operating and in-development LNG terminals and gas pipelines in Europe



Within Europe, the countries with the most LNG import capacity in development are Germany (89.9 bcm/y), Italy (31.3 bcm/y), Greece (26 bcm/y), the United Kingdom (24.2 bcm/y), and Ireland (14.9 bcm/y) (Figure 2; Table 2). After China and India, Germany has the most LNG import capacity in development globally. Strong government and private sector support for LNG have launched the country to becoming one of Europe's top LNG importers, up from having no import terminals less than two years ago.

In terms of gas pipelines, the countries with the largest plans are Greece (2,795 km), Italy (1,923 km), Poland (1,516 km), Serbia (1,081 km), and Romania (1,052 km) (Table 2). There are just five pipelines in development that would import gas into Europe, including the proposed 5,660 km <u>Nigeria-Morocco</u> <u>Gas Pipeline</u>, which would bring gas into Spain from Nigeria, and proposed capacity expansions to the existing <u>Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline</u> (TANAP), which runs from Georgia through Türkiye to Greece.

Even though Europe's LNG plans have advanced quickly since early 2022, a few projects faced setbacks in 2023 that could indicate waning enthusiasm for LNG. Shannon FSRU (8.2 bcm/y) in Ireland was denied permission by a planning board due to its policy on fracked gas. Skulte LNG Terminal (4.1 bcm/y) lost support from the government of Latvia because it deemed the project no longer necessary. Poland's Gaz-System decided to shelve a second planned FSRU (4.5 bcm/y) at its Polish Baltic Sea Coast FSRU project because of low interest in booking its capacity. Overall, GEM finds that 17.6 bcm/y of LNG import capacity in development is shelved and at least 60.6 bcm/y delayed.



Figure 2: Europe's LNG import plans led by Germany, Italy, and Greece

LNG import capacity by status, billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y); countries ordered by capacity in development

| Albania 326 323 1 1 323 Andorra | Country | Pipeline length (km) | Pipeline cost (million €) | LNG import capacity (bcm/y) | LNG terminal cost (million €) | Total cost (million €) |
|--|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Andorra 9 214 214 Austria 59 214 214 Belarus | Albania | 326 | 323 | | . , | 323 |
| Austria 59 214 214 Belgus | Andorra | | | | | |
| Belaus Image: Constant of the second se | Austria | 59 | 214 | | | 214 |
| Belgium 148 533 8.2 116 649 Bosnia and Herzegovina 677 319 | Belarus | | | | | |
| Bashia and Herzegovine 677 319 149 149 Bulgaria 547 1.469 1,489 1,489 Coratia 871 1.056 10.2 1,180 2,2736 Cyprus 921 2,711 2.7 5,42 3,253 Denmark 52 187 187 187 Estonia 1 4 6,5 1,150 1,184 Denmark 52 187 80 2,946 2,946 Germany 735 2,554 89.9 18,084 20,038 1313 Gibraltar - - 1496 1,752 18,46 Iceland 2 5 94 14.9 1,752 18,46 Israel 2,46 7 | Belaium | 148 | 533 | 8.2 | 116 | 649 |
| Bulgaria 647 1,489 1,489 Crostia 871 1,066 10.2 1,180 2,286 Cyprus 921 2,711 2,7 542 3,253 Czech Republic 232 487 | Bosnia and Herzegovina | 677 | 319 | | | 319 |
| Croatia 871 1.056 10.2 1,180 2,236 Cyprus 921 2,711 2.7 542 3,253 Crech Republic 232 487 487 487 Dermark 52 187 187 187 Estonia 1 4 6.5 1,150 1,154 Finand 1 4 6.5 1,150 1,154 France 8.0 2.946 2.946 2.946 Germany 735 2.554 89.9 18.084 20.638 Gibraltar | Bulgaria | 547 | 1.489 | | | 1.489 |
| Opros 921 2,711 2.7 542 3,253 Crech Republic 232 487 | Croatia | 871 | 1.056 | 10.2 | 1.180 | 2.236 |
| Czech Republic 232 487 487 Denmak 52 187 187 Estonia 1 4 6.5 1,150 1,154 Finland - - - 2,946 2,946 Germany 735 2,554 89 18,084 20,638 Gibralar - - - - - Greece 2,795 8,654 26.0 4,759 13,413 Hungary 189 496 - 496 - Iceland - - 707 13,413 Hungary 189 496 - 707 Italy 1,923 5,517 31.3 5,669 1,206 Kosovo - - - - - Liechtenstein - - - - - Liechtenstein - - - - - Moraco - - - | Cvprus | 921 | 2.711 | 2.7 | 542 | 3.253 |
| Dermark 52 187 187 Estonia 1 4 6.5 1,150 1,154 France 8.0 2,946 2,946 Greace 2,795 8,654 26.0 4,759 13,413 Hungary 189 496 496 496 Iceland 26 94 14.9 1,752 1,846 Israel 246 707 707 707 707 Italy 1,923 5,517 31.3 5,699 11,206 Kosovo 707 707 136 11,00 136 Latvia 32 26 4.1 110 136 1205 Kosovo 1,259 2.5 412 1,971 Lutvania 432 1,559 2.5 412 1,971 Lutvania 70 181 181 Moldva 500 345 Monaco 325 <td>Czech Republic</td> <td>232</td> <td>487</td> <td></td> <td>• ·-</td> <td>487</td> | Czech Republic | 232 | 487 | | • ·- | 487 |
| Estonia 1 4 6.5 1,150 1,154 Finland | Denmark | 52 | 187 | | | 187 |
| Finland Finland Finland France 8.0 2.946 2.946 Germany 735 2.554 89.9 18.084 20.638 Gibraltar | Estonia | 1 | 4 | 6.5 | 1.150 | 1.154 |
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| Hungary 189 496 496 Iceland | Greece | 2.795 | 8.654 | 26.0 | 4.759 | 13.413 |
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| Ireland 26 94 14.9 1,752 1,846 Israel 246 707 707 707 Italy 1,923 5,517 31.3 5,689 11,206 Kosovo | Iceland | | | | | |
| Israel 246 707 707 Italy 1,923 5,517 31.3 5,689 11,206 Kosovo | Ireland | 26 | 94 | 14.9 | 1.752 | 1.846 |
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| Moldova Moldova Monaco Montenegro 141 252 0.5 89 341 Netherlands 61 220 11.5 1,587 1,807 North Macedonia 372 345 345 345 Norway 195 352 352 352 Poland 1,516 3,856 8.2 1,554 5,410 Portugal Romania 1,052 934 934 934 San Marino Serbia 1,081 1,377 1,377 Slovakia Slovenia 528 1,114 1,114 Spain 1,947 Sweden Sweden Sweden 523 1,947 1,947 Switzerland 156 269 269 269 Ukraine 350 1,164 1,164 1,164 Uhraine 350 1,164 1,164 1,164 Uhraine 350 761 24.2 4,453 5,223 Total | Malta | 70 | 181 | | | 181 |
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| Netherlands 61 220 11.5 1,587 1,807 North Macedonia 372 345 345 345 Norway 195 352 352 352 Poland 1,516 3,856 8.2 1,554 5,410 Portugal | Montenearo | 141 | 252 | 0.5 | 89 | 341 |
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| Serbia 1,081 1,377 1,377 Slovakia | San Marino | , | | | | |
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| Slovenia 528 1,114 Spain 523 1,947 Sweden 1,947 Switzerland 1 Türkiye 156 269 Ukraine 350 1,164 United Kingdom 236 761 24.2 16,491 39,702 248.7 44,434 84,137 | Slovakia | , | / | | | , |
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| Sweden 100 100 Switzerland - | Spain | 523 | 1,947 | | | 1,947 |
| Switzerland 269 269 Türkiye 156 269 269 Ukraine 350 1,164 1,164 United Kingdom 236 761 24.2 4,463 5,223 Total 16,491 39,702 248.7 44,434 84,137 | Sweden | | /- ·· | | | , |
| Türkiye 156 269 269 Ukraine 350 1,164 1,164 United Kingdom 236 761 24.2 4,463 5,223 Total 16,491 39,702 248.7 44,434 84,137 | Switzerland | | | | | |
| Ukraine 350 1,164 1,164 United Kingdom 236 761 24.2 4,463 5,223 Total 16,491 39,702 248.7 44,434 84,137 | Türkive | 156 | 269 | | | 269 |
| United Kingdom 236 761 24.2 4,463 5,223 Total 16,491 39,702 248.7 44,434 84,137 | Ukraine | 350 | 1,164 | | | 1.164 |
| Total 16,491 39,702 248.7 44,434 84,137 | United Kingdom | 236 | 761 | 24.2 | 4,463 | 5.223 |
| | Total | 16,491 | 39,702 | 248.7 | 44,434 | 84,137 |

Table 2: Planned buildout and estimated cost for gas transmission pipelines and LNG import terminals in Europe, including all projects proposed or under construction

GLOBAL ENERGY MONITOR

THE COSTS OF NEW GAS INFRASTRUCTURE: €84.1 BILLION, 300 COAL PLANTS' EMISSIONS, AND MORE OVERCAPACITY

A continued gas buildout in Europe will be costly, in more ways than one. The capital expenditure and fuel costs associated with new projects could burden European governments and citizens; emissions from new projects risk pulling the region away from its own climate goals; and more LNG import terminals could exacerbate inefficiencies at existing facilities, where underutilization is the norm.

The price tag of Europe's planned gas buildout is €84.1 billion

GEM estimates that the total capital expenditure in new European gas infrastructure could be €44.4 billion for LNG terminals and €39.7 billion for gas pipelines, for a total of €84.1 billion (Table 2).² Projects already in construction amount to a total of €10 billion. Germany, Italy, and Greece, which are developing the most gas infrastructure in Europe, are together responsible for half of these plans (€45.3 billion) (Figure 3). As Europe plans to decarbonize over the coming decades, continued investment in new gas infrastructure, built to last for decades, increases the risk that countries will be saddled with costly stranded assets. Furthermore, these steep costs represent only the upfront payment for an expanded gas economy. European gas consumers paid over €1 trillion for the fuel between 2021 and the summer of 2023.



Figure 3: Half the costs of Europe's gas buildout split among Germany, Greece, and Italy

Top fifteen European countries' estimated capital expenditures in prospective LNG import terminals and gas pipelines (billion ${\ensuremath{\in}}$)

2. GEM's cost estimates use reported project costs, where available, and use these data to calculate regional averages applied to projects without reported cost data. For more information on this methodology, see the page for the <u>GGIT cost estimates</u>.

New gas pipelines and LNG terminals could boost Europe's emissions by up to one-quarter

The EU's emissions goals are incompatible with the planned gas buildout. The EU's Fit for 55 plan aims to reduce emissions by <u>55% by 2030</u>, and in February, the European Commission called for an additional goal of reducing emissions by <u>90% by 2040</u>. In December 2023, seven European economies responsible for almost half of the EU's power sector committed to be <u>fossil-free by 2035</u> under the Pentalateral Energy Forum. France, Germany, and the Netherlands are among those making the pledge.

GEM estimates that the LNG terminals and gas pipelines already in construction in Europe, if fully used, could result in an additional 195 megatonnes CO_2 equivalent (CO_2e), on par with the annual emissions of 50 coal plants. Including proposed projects, the additional annual emissions could grow six-fold to 1.1 gigatonnes CO_2e , equivalent to that of nearly 300 coal plants, or a quarter of Europe's emissions in 2020 (Table 3).³ It is unlikely all projects in development will be constructed, but over decades, when Europe plans to slash emissions, additional gas consumption will make it only more difficult to reach these goals.

As Europe's gas demand declines, new LNG import infrastructure will only worsen existing overcapacity

As gas demand falls across Europe and is set to keep falling due to climate policy goals, new infrastructure to import gas into Europe is not needed. Importantly, utilization rates for existing LNG import infrastructure show there is already ample spare capacity. According to IEEFA, between January and September 2023, the average utilization rate of Europe's LNG import terminals was merely 58%. An analysis from Food and Water Action Europe corroborates these findings and notes that the average utilization rate in Germany is just 50%. Germany is planning the world's third-largest buildout of LNG import terminals, yet its three operating terminals, all of which were proposed and built in response to the gas crisis, are operating at just half capacity. Greece has the third-most LNG capacity in development in Europe, after Germany and Italy, but the lowest terminal utilization rate in Europe at 36%.

GEM's data on infrastructure plans paired with demand forecasts reveal a widening gap between import capacity and demand. In terms of LNG

| Country | LNG Import Terminals (MtCO ₂ e) | Gas Import Pipelines (MtCO ₂ e) | Total Emissions (MtCO ₂ e) |
|----------------|--|--|---------------------------------------|
| Germany | 376 | | 376 |
| Greece | 109 | 24* | 132 |
| Italy | 131 | | 131 |
| United Kingdom | 101 | | 101 |
| Ireland | 62 | | 62 |
| Netherlands | 48 | | 48 |
| Spain | | 45 | 45 |
| Croatia | 43 | | 43 |
| Poland | 34 | | 34 |
| Belgium | 34 | | 34 |
| Other | 102 | | 102 |
| Total | 1,040 | 68 | 1,108 |

Table 3: Estimated emissions from LNG import terminals and gas import pipelines under development, for the top ten European countries

*Greece's gas pipeline import emissions are shared with Türkiye, both of which would import gas through expansions to the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline.

^{3.} Emissions are estimated using import capacity values scaled by estimates presented in <u>Kühne 2021</u>. This methodology uses the global warming potential for methane over a 20-year time period.

capacity alone, Europe's import capacity in 2023 (318.7 bcm/y) exceeded its LNG demand (167 bcm) by nearly a factor of two. If all of the import capacity in development were built by 2030, Europe's LNG import capacity (567.5) would exceed IEEFA's forecast for LNG demand (134.7 bcm) by over a factor of four (Figure 4).

When combining import capacity for LNG with that of piped gas, the picture is similar. The IEA's 2023 World Energy Outlook finds that <u>gas demand in Europe will</u> <u>fall</u> by 28% by the end of the decade, from 544 bcm in 2022 to 390 bcm in 2030, if countries meet their climate targets (IEA's Announced Pledges Scenario). Including infrastructure under construction alone, Europe is on track to have an excess of 352 bcm/y import capacity via LNG terminals and gas pipelines by 2030, or enough spare capacity to import <u>as much gas as China</u> <u>consumed in 2022</u>. If everything proposed is developed as well, that gap almost doubles to 601 bcm/y.⁴

Europe already has sufficient import capacity, as evidenced by its successful pivot away from piped Russian gas imports. New import projects would only widen the gap between gas demand and capacity. The wave of new LNG terminals represents a strategic shift toward LNG imports for energy security, but Europe already has enough LNG import infrastructure to meet its needs, for now and for the future. Furthermore, increased import capacity fails to address energy security risks inherent to gas — that it is a global commodity subject to price volatility and supply disruptions.

Figure 4: Europe's LNG import capacity vs. demand gap is set to widen

LNG import capacity and demand in 2023 and projections for 2030

LNG import capacity (bcm/y) LNG demand (bcm)

Last year, LNG import capacity was almost twice as much as the demand



By 2030, if all projects in development come online, import capacity could be *four* times more than predicted demand



Source: Europe Gas Tracker, Global Energy Monitor & European LNG Tracker, IEEFA • *2030 data: GEM's maximum LNG import capacity, assuming all projects in development are completed, and IEEFA's LNG demand forecast



4. Data from the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG) are used for Europe's existing gas pipeline import capacity. The calculations also factor in IEA's forecast for Europe's domestic gas production, as well as its total gas demand, to calculate its imported gas demand.

THE 35,000 KM HYDROGEN BUILDOUT: A RED HERRING

Alongside the EU's slate of LNG terminals and pipelines in development, a parallel expansion of gas infrastructure is being planned – for hydrogen. A massive network of hydrogen-based power infrastructure known as the European Hydrogen Backbone (EHB), promoted by 33 Transmission System Operators (TSOs), has been gaining momentum. Most recently, the European Commission adopted its 6th list of Projects of Common Interest (PCI) in November, which offers cross-border EU energy projects accelerated permitting and funding, and for the first time, as many as 65 of 166 projects are hydrogen-related. Much of the industry support around EU hydrogen infrastructure contends that the fuel offers a way to decarbonize the EU's power sector while retaining, and continuing to profit from, investments in existing gas (i.e., methane gas) infrastructure. However, methane gas infrastructure is largely unsuitable for hydrogen gas, and, as currently envisioned, the EHB could constitute a red herring for the bloc's decarbonization efforts.

According to GEM's <u>Global Gas Infrastructure Tracker</u>, about 35,000 km of hydrogen transmission pipelines are currently proposed across Europe with the intention of carrying 100% hydrogen, or close to that (Figure 5; Table A4).⁵ Among these proposals, many of which form major national hydrogen networks or ambitious offshore routes weaving together European cities and production centers, nearly 12,700 km (36%) are proposed as repurposed methane gas pipelines, another 5,200 km (almost 15%) will involve some combination of new-build hydrogen infrastructure and repurposed methane infrastructure, and the remaining 17,500 km (50%) will be new-build hydrogen transmission pipelines. When considering all infrastructure that is proposed to be "hydrogen capable" — pipelines that can carry any amount of hydrogen — this collective length swells to over 63,000 km. Such proposals often hinge on the idea of "repurposed" methane pipelines — a term roundly touted as a misnomer, as methane gas pipelines are <u>unsuitable</u> for carrying hydrogen and will essentially need to be completely rebuilt. Just one hydrogen pipeline is <u>under construction</u> in the Netherlands, and only 2% of hydrogen pipelines by length have reached a final investment decision (FID) or are in another advanced stage of development, according to the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (<u>ENTSOG</u>).

The European Commission's 6th PCI list adds substantial weight to these plans. Eligible for faster permitting and public funding are <u>hydrogen projects costing in</u> <u>total over €50 billion</u>, according to an estimate from Food and Water Action Europe. Large swaths of the EHB are among these latest PCI projects, including the Central European Hydrogen Corridor, the H2ercules Pipeline, the West Danish Hydrogen Network, the Belgian Hydrogen Backbone, the Nordic-Baltic Hydrogen Corridor, and the Nordic Hydrogen Route.

Of the 35,000 km of proposed hydrogen transmission pipelines tracked by GEM, about 22,400 km are included within projects on the 6th PCI list, led by massive proposed networks in Germany and Spain (Table A4). But details on these projects are scarce. Many of their developers claim that substantial portions of project routes will consist of repurposed methane gas pipelines but feature no technical details on what this repurposing entails, only illustrative rather than accurate maps of pipeline routes, and few details on exactly how much hydrogen will be carried in the pipelines.

^{5.} Some of the hydrogen pipeline classification data discussed here are not yet published along with GEM's gas pipeline data set, but are available upon request.

Furthermore, some hydrogen pipelines on the PCI list appear nearly identical to older methane gas pipeline projects that were proposed for PCI status or that made it onto previous PCI lists, begging the question as to whether "hydrogen-readiness" could be little more than a license to build gas projects. Some examples include massive, cross-border connections such as the <u>H2Med Pipeline</u> project (the newest iteration of the <u>Midi-Catalonia Gas Pipeline</u>) and the <u>SoutH2</u> <u>Pipeline</u> (a slightly altered <u>GALSI Pipeline</u>), as well as a number of smaller, national projects.

While hydrogen produced with renewable energy could be a low-carbon solution for certain,

Figure 5: Europe pivots to hydrogen

H₂ transmission pipelines proposed in Europe by 2030



hard-to-decarbonize sectors, the emerging vision of a methane gas system that will seamlessly switch to hydrogen for power and heating is a potentially dangerous distraction. There are multiple issues with substituting hydrogen into existing methane gas infrastructure, including:

- Methane gas infrastructure cannot be easily repurposed for hydrogen. Methane gas infrastructure is largely <u>unsuitable for hydrogen gas</u>, either pure or blended, because of the differences in the gases' physical properties. To accept hydrogen, pipelines, compressors, turbines, and other components would require <u>major overhauls</u>; most existing infrastructure can only carry miniscule amounts of hydrogen in its current state. Depending on the type of pipeline material used, cheaply repurposing methane pipelines on the scale envisioned by proponents of the EHB is <u>virtually</u> <u>impossible</u>.
- Blending hydrogen into methane gas-fired generation offers little in the way of emissions reductions. Most new gas turbines can only burn a maximum of 20-40% hydrogen within their fuel mix; expanding beyond that will require almost total overhauls of the turbines. While this may initially seem like a quick route to decreasing emissions from methane gas by 20-40%, burning a 20% mixture of hydrogen doesn't translate to an equivalent decrease in carbon emissions. This is because hydrogen has a much lower energy output by volume than methane gas, so the 20% blend of hydrogen only reduces methane usage by 7%. Even among these supposedly "hydrogen-capable" turbines, startlingly few have any realistic plans to source the hydrogen, or a plan for a real phaseout of gas. Projects such as the Crodux Slavonski Brod power station or the <u>Ca's Tresorer power</u> station, which have made progress toward building localized hydrogen infrastructure, will only burn between 2-10% hydrogen initially – hardly enough to make even the smallest dent in their total emissions.

- Hydrogen for heating and power is inefficient. The process of producing green hydrogen for power and heat is expensive and a less efficient use of renewable resources than simply using renewable power directly. As with any transfer of energy, converting power to hydrogen is an imperfect process. The efficiency of the best electrolysers stands at about 70%, with the other 30% being lost in the production of the hydrogen. Expert analysis also suggests that taking into consideration loss during production and transmission reduces the overall emissions reductions from blending 15% hydrogen into the system to less than 2% — a frustratingly low number considering the scale of the investments proposed.
- There is a massive gap between current green hydrogen production and the requirements of the EHB. As of 2022, the world consumed <u>95 million</u> tons of hydrogen; 62% was produced with gas, 21% with coal, and 16% with oil (emitting more <u>carbon</u> into the atmosphere than the global aviation industry in 2021 in the process). Just 0.7% of global hydrogen production today is low-emissions electrolysis. The EU produced 8 million tonnes of hydrogen in 2021, of which 96% was from methane cracking. Accordingly, the European Commission estimates that some €24-40 billion is required to build the 65 GW of hydrogen electrolysis needed, in addition to the €3-400 billion required to develop the 150-200 GW of renewable energy required to power it – an amount almost equal to all of Europe's existing wind-powered energy capacity. While concrete plans for how such large-scale production can be achieved are not yet available, it is likely that if green hydrogen can't be found to fill these pipelines, the industry will turn to fossilbased hydrogen in order to meet the needs of the investments made, thereby destroying any possibility of emissions reductions. In its Renewables 2023 report, the IEA revised its hydrogen forecast downward, finding that just 7% of hydrogen projects planned to start by 2030 will start by then due to a lack of offtakers and other challenges.

Industry experts have highlighted that many projects, including those selected as PCI candidates, will <u>require major changes</u> to be feasible, under much changed market conditions for hydrogen. In January

CONCLUSION

Europe's energy landscape is different than it was a year or two ago. The region is no longer in an energy crisis and European countries have successfully procured enough gas two winters in a row, all while power sector trends point to an <u>accelerating transition</u> to clean energy. Still, the rush to build new gas infrastructure sparked by the gas crisis continues.

EU countries' policies send mixed messages of support to the gas industry. On one hand, the bloc has set strong climate targets: reducing emissions 55% by 2030 and achieving net zero emissions by 2050, potentially with an interim goal of reducing emissions 90% by 2040. Its new <u>methane regulation</u> and the expansion of its cap-and-trade <u>emissions trading system</u> 2024, IEA head Fatih Birol said "Hydrogen will definitely become more important," but noted that "the current excessive expectations could distract from the fact that there are more important problems to solve."

could slash emissions from existing gas imports and disincentivize LNG consumption. At the same time, LNG projects continue to receive public support from the governments of <u>Germany</u> and <u>Italy</u>, among others. And the EU's 6th PCI list lends legitimacy and policy support to a massive expansion of what is nominally called hydrogen infrastructure, which could ultimately lock in more gas consumption, rather than usher in a new low-carbon sector.

The stakes of Europe's energy planning are high, and governments should consider how to better align a looming €84.1 billion gas buildout with the region's energy transition.

APPENDIX

Table A1: LNG import infrastructure under construction and proposed in Europe

| Country | Terminal name | Capacity (bcm/y) | Cost (million €) |
|----------------|--|------------------|------------------|
| | Construction | | |
| Greece | Alexandroupolis FSRU | 5.5 | 360 |
| Germany | Brunsbüttel LNG Terminal | 8.0 | 1,300 |
| Cyprus | Cyprus LNG Terminal | 2.7 | 542 |
| Netherlands | Gate LNG Terminal Expansion | 4.0 | 350 |
| United Kingdom | Grain LNG Terminal Expansion | 5.2 | 200 |
| Estonia | Paldiski FSRU | | 500 |
| Germany | Stade FSRU | 6.0 | 990 |
| Germany | Wilhelmshaven TES FSRU | 5.0 | 825 |
| Belgium | Zeebrugge LNG Terminal 2024 Expansion | 6.4 | 116 |
| Belgium | Zeebrugge LNG Terminal 2026 Expansion | 1.8 | 110 |
| Poland | Świnoujście Polskie LNG Terminal Expansion 2 | 2.1 | 934 |
| Subtotal | | 46.7 | 6,117 |
| | Proposed | | |
| Greece | Argo FSRU | 4.6 | 227 |
| Montenegro | Bar LNG Terminal | 0.5 | 89 |
| Romania | Black Sea LNG Terminal Import Facility | | |
| Greece | <u>Dioriga FSRU</u> | 2.6 | 300 |
| France | Fos Cavaou LNG Terminal Expansion 2 | 5.5 | 2,446 |
| Italy | <u>Gioia Tauro LNG Terminal</u> | 12.0 | 1,000 |
| United Kingdom | Grangemouth FSRU | 6.8 | 489 |
| Lithuania | Klaipeda FSRU Expansion | 2.5 | 412 |
| Croatia | Krk FSRU Phase T Expansion | 3.2 | 25 |
| Croatia | Krk FSRU Phase 2 Expansion | 7.0 | 1,155 |
| Germany | Lubmin FSRU Phase 2 (Vessel 1) | 2.0 | 12 |
| Germany | Lubmin FSRU Phase 2 (Vessel 2) | 7.0 | 42 |
| Germany | LUDMIN RWE FSRU | 5.0 | 825 |
| France | Montoir LNG Terminal Expansion | 2.5 | 500 |
| Germany | Mukran FSRU Phase 1 | 10 5 | 0.007 |
| Germany | MUKIAN FSRU PNASE 2 | 13.5 | 2,221 |
| Estonia | Paldiski Ling Terminal | 2.5 | 400 |
| Deland | Plict Colk FSRU | 4.1 | 600 |
| Albania | Polisii Dalilo Sed Codst FSRU | 0.1 | 020 |
| | Porto Empedeelo I NG Terminal | 8.0 | 1 000 |
| | Porto Torres ESRU | 5.0 | 2 224 |
| Italy | Portovesme FSRI | 5.0 | 2,224 |
| Ireland | Predator ESBU | 2.6 | 420 |
| Italy | Bavenna ESBU | 5.0 | 1 000 |
| Latvia | Biga ESBLI Bevived Project | 0.0 | 1,000 |
| Germany | Bostock I NG Terminal | 11 | 485 |
| Ireland | Shannon ESBU | 8.3 | 650 |
| Latvia | Skulte I NG Terminal | 4.1 | 110 |
| United Kingdom | South Hook I NG Terminal Expansion | 6.3 | 2,784 |
| Germany | Stade LNG Terminal | 13.3 | 1.000 |
| Estonia | Tallinn LNG Terminal | 4.0 | 250 |
| United Kingdom | Teesside GasPort FSRU Recommissioned Project | 6.0 | 990 |
| Greece | Thessaloniki FSRU | 7.3 | 1,204 |
| Greece | Thrace FSRU | 6.0 | 2,668 |
| Italy | Toscana FSRU Expansion (Efficiency) | 1.3 | 206 |
| Germany | Wilhelmshaven NWO FSRU | 9.0 | 1,485 |
| Germany | Wilhelmshaven TES LNG Terminal | 20.0 | 8,894 |
| Netherlands | Zeeland Energy FSRU | 7.5 | 1,237 |
| Subtotal | | 202 | 38,318 |
| Grand total | | 248.7 | 44.434 |

| Country | Pipeline name | Status | Capacity (bcm/y) | Length in country (km) | Cost for country's segment (million €) |
|---------|---|--------------|---------------------|------------------------------|--|
| Türkiye | Arab Gas Pipeline Syria-Türkiye Extension (310 km total length) | Proposed | | 10 | 36 |
| Spain | Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline (5,660 km total length) | Proposed | 30 | 138 | 559 |
| Greece | - Trans Apatolian Cap Dipoling Dhase 2 Capacity Expansion | Dropood | 7 | 0 now km | |
| Türkiye | Trans-Allatolian Gas Pipeline Phase 3 Capacity Expansion | Proposed | 1 | U HEW KIT | |
| Greece | - Trans Anatolian Cas Dingling TANAD V Canagity Expansion | Dropood | 0 | 0 now km | |
| Türkiye | | Floposed | 9 | U HEW KIT | |
| Ukraine | Taganrog-Melitopol-Berdyansk Gas Pipeline | Construction | | 221 | 796 |
| Total | | | 46 | 148 | 594 |

Table A2: Pipeline transmission infrastructure under construction and proposed for gas import into Europe

Table A3: All pipeline infrastructure (import, export, and within-Europe transmission) under construction and proposed within Europe's borders

| Country | Pipeline name | Capacity (bcm/y) | Total pipeline length (km) | Estimated length in country (km) | Cost (million Euro) |
|--------------------------------|---|---------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|
| | Constructi | ion | 5 () | | ~ / |
| Poland | Gustorzyn-Wronów Gas Pipeline | | 308 | 308 | 1,111 |
| Italy | Methanization of Sardinia Project | | 573 | 573 | 600 |
| Poland | Pogórska-Wola-Tworzen Gas Pipeline | | 168 | 168 | 301 |
| Ukraine | <u>Taganrog-Melitopol-Berdyansk Gas Pipeline</u> | | 273 | 221 | 796 |
| Pipelines with length < 150 ki | m | | | 609 | 1,111 |
| Subtotal | Deserve | | | 1,878 | 3,918 |
| Italy | Adviction Divoling | 0.0 | 170 | 170 | EE A |
| Albania | Aurialica Pipeline | 0.0 | 170 | 107 | 100 |
| Sorbio | <u>Albania–Kosovo Gas Pipeline</u> | | 212 | 107 | 109 |
| Lithuania | Amher Grid Gas Transmission System | | 287 | 287 | 1.035 |
| Tiirkive | Arab Gas Pineline | | 310 | 10 | 36 |
| Norway | Rarents Sea Pineline | | 105 | 105 | 352 |
| Bomania | Black Sea Shore–Podisor Gas Pineline | 15.0 | 308 | 308 | 360 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | Bospia and Herzegovina-Croatia South Interconnection | 10.0 | 000 | 121 | 79 |
| Croatia | <u>Gas Pipeline</u> | 1.5 | 184 | 63 | 41 |
| Cyprus | Cyprus-Egypt Gas Pipeline | 8.0 | 310 | 33 | 98 |
| Czech Republic | | | 007 | 155 | 211 |
| Poland | Uzech-Polish Interconnector Gas Pipeline (UPI) | | 207 | 52 | 70 |
| Greece | | | | 1,275 | 4,090 |
| Cyprus | EastMed Gas Pipeline | 10 | 1,870 | 569 | 1,827 |
| Türkiye | _ | | | 26 | 83 |
| Slovenia | _ | | | 117 | 125 |
| Hungary | Hungary-Slovenia-Italy Interconnector Gas Pipeline | 1.24 | 191 | 74 | 79 |
| Italy | | | | 1 | 1 |
| Croatia | – Interconnector Croatia-Serbia | 7 | 182 | 109 | 93 |
| Serbia | | | | 73 | 62 |
| Croatia | | - | 5.40 | 262 | 284 |
| Albania | Ionian Adriatic Gas Pipeline | 5 | 540 | 1/6 | 191 |
| Ournerus | | | | 102 | 111 |
| | <u>Israel Cyprus Gas Pipeline</u> | 4 | 215 | 102 | 71 |
| Israel | | | | 127 | /03 |
| | <u>Israel-Egypt Offshore Gas Pipeline</u> | 10 | 593 | | 157 |
| Tiirkive | Iŭdur-Nakhchivan Gas Pipeline | 0.5 | 160 | 79 | 6 |
| Italy | | 0.0 | 100 | 89 | 229 |
| Malta | Malta-Italy Gas Pipeline | 2.03 | 159 | 70 | 181 |
| Spain | Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline | 30.0 | 5,660 | 138 | 559 |
| Romania | North-Vest Romania Pipeline | | 518 | 518 | 405 |
| Croatia | Omišalj-Zlobin-Bosiljevo-Sisak-Kozarac-Slobodnica | 10.0 | 180 | 180 | 198 |
| Sarbia | Paracin-Pancovo Cas Pinolino | | 230 | 230 | 65 |
| Greece | Faraciti-Fancevo Gas Fipeline | | 2.39 | 014 | 3 183 |
| Italy | Poseidon Gas Pipeline | 15.0 | 976 | 62 | 217 |
| United Kingdom | Rosebank Gas Pineline | | 236 | 236 | 761 |
| Italy | Sealine Tirrenica Gas Pipeline | | 255 | 255 | 920 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | Serbia-Bosnia Interconnector Gas Pipeline | 1.2 | 320 | 320 | 80 |
| Bulgaria | | | 050 | 164 | 565 |
| Greece | Solia-Sidirokastro Gas Pipeline | | 250 | 86 | 295 |
| Germany | South German Gas Pipeline | | 250 | 250 | 902 |
| Italy | - Spain-Italy Offshore Interconnector | 30.0 | 700 | 350 | 1,263 |
| Spain | | 30.0 | 100 | 350 | 1,263 |
| Poland | Wloclawek-Lomza Gas Pipeline | | 235 | 235 | 847 |
| Pipelines with length < 150 ki | m | | | 5,310 | 12,903 |
| Subtotal | | | | 14,613 | 35,784 |
| Grand total | | | | 16,491 | 39,702 |

| Country | 6th PCI list (km) | Additional proposed (km) | Country total (km) |
|----------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|
| Germany | 4,121 | 3,906 | 8,027 |
| Spain | 3,068 | 79 | 3,147 |
| Finland | 1,745 | 835 | 2,580 |
| Italy | 2,298 | 148 | 2,445 |
| France | 1,520 | 865 | 2,384 |
| United Kingdom | | 2,000 | 2,000 |
| Sweden | 1,251 | 496 | 1,746 |
| Netherlands | 1,421 | 109 | 1,530 |
| Norway | 557 | 876 | 1,432 |
| Portugal | 515 | 797 | 1,312 |
| Belgium | 834 | 22 | 856 |
| Austria | 722 | 87 | 809 |
| Denmark | 575 | 222 | 798 |
| Czech Republic | 595 | 152 | 747 |
| Poland | 712 | 20 | 731 |
| Hungary | | 675 | 675 |
| Lithuania | 518 | 138 | 655 |
| Slovakia | 585 | 46 | 631 |
| Romania | | 599 | 599 |
| Greece | 465 | 12 | 476 |
| Bulgaria | 250 | 116 | 366 |
| Ukraine | 183 | 147 | 330 |
| Slovenia | | 297 | 297 |
| Latvia | 235 | 6 | 241 |
| Estonia | 225 | 6 | 230 |
| Ireland | | 12 | 12 |
| Luxembourg | | 6 | 6 |
| Total | 22,394 | 12,672 | 35,065 |

Table A4: Proposed hydrogen transmission pipeline infrastructure in Europe by member state, including blended hydrogen proposals

| Parent | Pipeline costs (million €) | Terminal (million €) | Total costs (million €) |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| Snam | 6,186 | 3,584 | 9,771 |
| Tree Energy Solutions | | 9,169 | 9,169 |
| Electricite de France | 4,700 | | 4,700 |
| unknown | 4,591 | | 4,591 |
| Gaz-System | 4,018 | | 4,018 |
| Engie | | 3,221 | 3,221 |
| Italgas | 3,055 | | 3,055 |
| Deutsche ReGas | | 2,281 | 2,281 |
| Hellenic Petroleum | 1,645 | 602 | 2,247 |
| QatarEnergy | | 1,879 | 1,879 |
| Fluxys | 932 | 564 | 1,496 |
| Energie Baden-Württemberg AG | 1,317 | | 1,317 |
| Gasunie | 577 | 608 | 1,185 |
| LNG Croatia LLC | | 1,180 | 1,180 |
| Enel | | 1,000 | 1,000 |
| Trafigura | | 990 | 990 |
| Srbijagas | 969 | | 969 |
| PGNiG | | 934 | 934 |
| Plinacro | 893 | | 893 |
| Transgaz | 890 | | 890 |
| Israel Natural Gas Lines | 792 | | 792 |
| Copelouzos Group | 170 | 606 | 776 |
| Vopak | | 733 | 733 |
| Pilot LNG | | 673 | 673 |
| ExxonMobil | | 672 | 672 |
| Equinor | 657 | | 657 |
| New Fortress Energy | | 650 | 650 |
| other | 573 | 71 | 644 |
| PKN Orlen | | 620 | 620 |
| Bulgartransgaz | | 606 | 606 |
| GasLog Cyprus Investments | | 606 | 606 |
| DEPA Commercial | | 606 | 606 |
| DESFA | | 606 | 606 |
| Edison | | 602 | 602 |
| Bulgarian Energy Holding | 595 | | 595 |
| SDH | 574 | | 574 |
| MOL Group | 545 | | 545 |
| Enagás | 326 | 199 | 525 |
| BP | 138 | 381 | 519 |
| Ruhr Oel GmbH | | 500 | 500 |

Table A5: Top parent companies developing LNG terminals and gas pipelines, by total estimated cost of infrastructure

(continued on next page)

| Parent | Pipeline costs (million €) | Terminal (million €) | Total costs (million €) |
|---|-------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| Government of Estonia | | 500 | 500 |
| Sorgenia | | 500 | 500 |
| Iren Group | | 500 | 500 |
| Crown LNG Holdings Ltd | | 489 | 489 |
| BarMalGas | | 485 | 485 |
| Buss Group | | 448 | 448 |
| Partners Group | | 448 | 448 |
| Dow Chemical | | 448 | 448 |
| Oiltanking | | 433 | 433 |
| Predator Oil & Gas | | 429 | 429 |
| RWE | | 412 | 412 |
| Vitol | | 412 | 412 |
| Stena AB | | 412 | 412 |
| ADNOC | | 412 | 412 |
| IFM Investors | | 412 | 412 |
| InterConnect Malta Ltd | 410 | | 410 |
| Alexela | 2 | 400 | 402 |
| Gazprom | 393 | | 393 |
| DEFA | | 379 | 379 |
| Shell | 34 | 303 | 337 |
| Delek Group | 333 | | 333 |
| Albgaz Sha | 323 | | 323 |
| Holburn Europa Raffinerie GmbH | | 301 | 301 |
| Motor Oil | | 300 | 300 |
| Lithuanian Ministry of Energy | | 299 | 299 |
| Energean E&P Holdings Limited | 299 | | 299 |
| Government of Greece | 296 | | 296 |
| Moroccan National Board of Hydrocarbons and Mines | 279 | | 279 |
| Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation | 279 | | 279 |
| E.ON | | 275 | 275 |
| Gasdotti Italia S.p.A. | 270 | | 270 |
| BH-Gas d.o.o. | 270 | | 270 |
| Samruk-Kazyna SWF JSC | 237 | | 237 |
| TotalEnergies | | 232 | 232 |
| Mediterranean Gas | | 227 | 227 |
| National Grid | | 200 | 200 |
| Gas Transmission System Operator of Ukraine | 167 | | 167 |
| Electricity Authority of Cyprus | | 163 | 163 |
| Suncor Energy | 152 | | 152 |
| Montenegro Bonus | 147 | | 147 |

Table A5: Top parent companies developing LNG terminals and gas pipelines, by total estimated cost of infrastructure (continued)

(continued on next page)

| Parent | Pipeline costs (million €) | Terminal (million €) | Total costs (million €) |
|---|-------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| SOCAR | 141 | | 141 |
| Allianz | 130 | | 130 |
| Port of Tallinn | | 125 | 125 |
| Nornickel PJSC | 124 | | 124 |
| Mubadala Investment Company | 115 | | 115 |
| OMV Group | 115 | | 115 |
| Ministry of Economic Development of Kosovo Republic | 107 | | 107 |
| Gas RES | 103 | | 103 |
| Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group | | 99 | 99 |
| Ervia | 94 | | 94 |
| Skulte LNG Terminal | | 88 | 88 |
| Bayerngas GmbH | 76 | | 76 |
| MER JSC Skopje | 73 | | 73 |
| Verbund | 59 | | 59 |
| ADIA | 58 | | 58 |
| BCI | 58 | | 58 |
| Macquarie Group Limited | 58 | | 58 |
| MEAG | 58 | | 58 |
| LNG Alliance | | 45 | 45 |
| Government of Montenegro | | 45 | 45 |
| UAB koncernas "Achemos grupė" | | 43 | 43 |
| Stadtwerke München GmbH | 41 | | 41 |
| JSC Mahistralni Gazoprovody Ukrainy (MGU) | 40 | | 40 |
| Ахро | 35 | | 35 |
| Chevron | 34 | | 34 |
| Virši-A | | 22 | 22 |
| Arbejdsmarkedets Tillægspension | 18 | | 18 |
| CNIC Corporation Limited | 18 | | 18 |
| Universities Superannuation Scheme | 18 | | 18 |
| Guoxin Guotong Fund | 18 | | 18 |
| CEMEX SAB de CV | 18 | | 18 |
| Acciona S.A | 18 | | 18 |
| Augstsprieguma Tikls | 18 | | 18 |
| Stadtwerke Augsburg Holding GmbH | 11 | | 11 |
| MM Capital Partners | 8 | | 8 |
| Golar LNG | | 6 | 6 |
| BOTAŞ | 3 | | 3 |
| Infortar | 2 | | 2 |
| Total | 39,702 | 44,434 | 84,137 |

Table A5: Top parent companies developing LNG terminals and gas pipelines, by total estimated cost of infrastructure (continued)

Table A6: Average costs for gas transmission pipelines and LNG import terminals, calculated by GEM to estimate unknown project costs

| Infrastructure type | Cost estimate (€ million) | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| Gas pipeline | 3.6 | to build 1 km of pipeline | |
| Import terminal – onshore | 561.9 | to build 1 bcm/y of terminal capacity | |
| Import terminal – floating | 208.8 | to build 1 bcm/y of terminal capacity | |

For more information, see the <u>GGIT cost estimates</u> wiki page.